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of economic globalization (up to World War I) and the subsequent period of international disintegration. By doing so, it provides some historical perspective on the more recent period of globalization. Moreover, by taking a longer view of the growth process than most of the recent literature, the article will make a connection between the economics of accumulation in the prewar period and the relative economic standing of countries in the postwar period.
The article has three main goals. First, it constructs measures of the relative price of capital goods and equipment across countries and over a long period. No other such database extends back to 1870, so the information contained here should be useful for economists and historians interested in the long-run evolution of price structures, capital accumulation, and growth. Second, the article investigates potential explanations for the observed trends over time and for differences across countries in these relative-price series. Third, it estimates the effect of differences in relative capital-goods prices on investment rates. The article concludes with speculation about how the conventional wisdom regarding "world capital-market integration" can be enriched by widening the scope of inquiry to include capital-goods prices.
We find that the international dispersion of relative capital-goods prices has narrowed considerably since 1870, especially for equipment, confirming commodity-price convergence. We also find a downward trend in the relative price of equipment in all countries prior to World War I, a trend which is confounded in the overall capital-goods price indices by a generally upward drift in construction prices. On the basis of the economic histories of Japan and the United States, we argue that the price ratio's decline reflects relatively fast productivity advance in the equipment-producing sector. Furthermore, we argue that cross-country differences in the relative price of capital goods reflected differences in productivity levels and skill endowments, and we find that countries with high overall tariff rates had relatively low capital-goods prices. Finally, we show that countries with relatively high capital-goods prices undertook relatively low rates of investment, implying that such price differences had important growth implications.
THE DATA
Capital-goods price indices underlie the real investment series of all national accounts. Because the overall capital-goods price series combine equipment prices with those of other capital goods, and because the existing literature emphasizes the connection between equipment investment and growth, we have made an effort to extract separate price series for equipment where possible. For comparison, we have also extracted buildingconstruction price series. All together we have price series for Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States.9 The Appendix describes the sources and construction of these series. For each country a relative price index is formed by dividing the capital-goods price index by the consumptiongoods price index.'0 The resulting series tell us how this relative price has changed over time within each country, but they do not tell us anything about differences in relative prices across countries. For example, we can tell that the price of investment goods relative to consumer goods fell in Japan and rose in the United States from the 1870s to the 1950s, but we cannot tell whether the relative price of capital goods in the United States was high or low compared to that in Japan at any point in time. To do so, we need to establish a cross-country benchmark. The earliest year for which this is possible is 1950, a year for which a purchasing-power parity price level is reported by the PWT for investment and consumption for each country. The benchmark permits a double comparison similar to that made by Charles Jones for the postwar period: we observe whether the price of capital goods relative to the price of consumption goods in a particular country is high or low compared to the same ratio in other countries. 1 Thus, we can say something about the relative cost of capital goods between countries as well as over time.
Unfortunately, the PWT does not provide price series for capital-goods components, and at the same time it is evident that the producer-durables price may differ substantially from the overall capital-goods price. This implies that the 1950 PWT figures for overall investment-goods prices are probably not reliable approximations of equipment or machinery prices. Instead, we take the producer-durables and consumer-goods price data from the United Nations' International Comparison Program for 1980 and extend these prices back to 1950 by using the producer-durables and consumergoods price indices implicit in the OECD country national accounts.'2 9 We would like to include more countries in the sample, but most do not have long and detailed national accounts stretching back to the nineteenth century.
10 Consumption goods are chosen for the comparison rather than the overall GDP deflator because the investment goods index is included in the GDP deflator. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell, "Long-Run" and Greenwood and Jovanovic, "Accounting" also relate capital goods prices to consumption goods prices. Furthermore, Jones ("Economic Growth," p. 361) shows that the choice does not matter for the 1960-1985 period.
Jones, "Economic Growth." 12 specifically, we take the 1980 benchmarks from United Nations (1987), and then we calculate the implicit price deflators from 1950 to 1980 using the nominal and real producers durables investment series in OECD, NationalAccounts Statistics 1950-1968 and NationalAccounts: Detailed Tables 1964-1981 . We have not tried to establish such benchmark estimates for the building series. Unlike Gordon, Measurement, we do not attempt to make quality adjustments to the reported national accounts price series. Based on Gordon's findings, such an adjustnent would almost certainly strengthen the findings in this article.
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Admittedly, this is not an ideal measure of relative capital-goods prices over time or across countries, as Simon Kuznets pointed out long ago.13 The national accounts capital-goods price series are often combinations of input prices rather than actual observations of capital-goods prices, as discussed in the Appendix. Consequently, they probably mismeasure productivity advance within the capital-goods sector. Furthermore, the methods of price estimation are not identical across countries, and so we cannot even expect that the biases work the same way and to the same extent in every country. Finally, using a single benchmark to anchor time series running back to 1870 could produce misleading comparisons.14 The farther we travel from the benchmark, the less certain our estimates become.
Nevertheless, after employing similar national accounts price series almost forty years ago, Robert Gordon observed that "To deny the existence of these differential price trends is to deny the validity of the deflated estimates of the components of GNP on which we all so heavily rely.""5 It is no surprise that historical national accounts data are quite imperfect, and so it is clear that we must proceed with caution. At the same time, it seems foolish to postpone the exploration of potentially important determinants of long-term economic growth simply because the data are not ideal. Until the next round of revision of historical national accounts (and their underlying price series) and the appearance of comprehensive cross-country capitalgoods price data for the nineteenth century, the comparisons we make here rely on the best evidence we could assemble. Table 1 Panel A reveals that the relative price of capital goods clearly did not trend at the same rate, or even in the same direction, in all countries. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States all had a rising relative price up to World War I, but some others, especially Japan, experienced a decline in the relative price of capital goods despite the fact that Panel B, however, shows that every country in our sample experienced a decline in the relative price of equipment up to 1914. This ubiquitous downward trend in the relative price of equipment leveled off or reversed itself in most countries during the tumultuous interwar period, Italy being the major exception with a continuing downward drift. Unlike the relative price of equipment, the relative price of building construction rose everywhere during the period under study. This upward trend tends to offset the downward drift of the equipment prices when the series are combined in the overall capital-goods prices index. Consequently, throughout the article, we are careful to distinguish the findings based on the overall capital-goods price series from those based on the equipment price series. The overall capitalgoods price sample has the benefit of being larger, but the equipment-price series is more in line with the literature emphasizing the importance of machinery investment to growth.
THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE CAPITAL GOODS PRICES, 1870-1950
What can be said about the variance in relative prices across countries at any given point in time? Compared to consumption goods, where were capital goods relatively cheap, and where were they relatively expensive? Ultimately, what were the implications for capital accumulation and growth? Over the 80 years as a whole, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all appear to have had relatively expensive capital goods, implying a relatively disadvantageous price structure for capital accumulation. Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom carried the heaviest burdens. Finland, Germany, Norway, and the United States all appear to have had relatively cheap capital goods, implying a favorable price structure for capital accumulation. The impact of these differences in price structure on rates of capital accumulation will be explored later, but this is a good time to remind the reader that it is the relative price of capital goods we are describing; consequently, differences in consumption-goods prices may matter as much as differences in capital-goods prices in explaining cross-country differences in the ratio.
The relative price of equipment declined in each of the nine sampled countries up to World War I, but the decline was much steeper in some than others; those with very expensive equipment relative to consumer goods in the 1870s experienced the steepest relative price declines up to World War I. As a result, the between-country spread in relative prices just prior to World War I was far smaller than in the late 1870s. At the extremes of the distribution, in the 1870s the relative prices of equipment in Japan and Italy were 7.9 and 3.5 times that of the United States, but by World War I those ratios had fallen to 2.8 and 3.0. The convergence phenomenon is illustrated in Figures IA and 1B where the change in the relative price of capital goods or equipment for each country over ten-to 15-year periods is graphed against the level of the price at the beginning of the period. This beta-convergence may have been driven by trade's equalization of prices across countries, by simple mean reversion from times of unusually high or low relative prices, by the convergence of productivity levels or skill endowments across the countries in the sample, or by some combination of all three.17 For the full distribution of relative prices, Table 3 reports the coefficient of variation from 1875 to 1990. Clearly, there has been sigma-convergence for capital-goods prices in the OECD for more than a century. Even when Japan is excluded from the sample, the dispersion of both relative capitalgoods prices and relative equipment prices were about half as large in 1950 as in 1870, and the epochs of big decline in the dispersion of capital-goods prices were 1885-1895, 1945-1950, and 1965-1985.18 During the two 17Beta convergence occurs when places with relatively high initial values of some variable tend to have relatively small increases in that variable over time. Sigma convergence occurs when the dispersion of a variable's values across countries falls over time. We borrow the terms from the empirical growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth).
18 T magnitude of the relative price change in Japan tends to dominate the change in the overall dispersion, and so we calculate the dispersion statistics both with and without Japan. Either way, there is clear evidence of a decline in price dispersion over the past century. world wars, when international commodity markets disintegrated, the capital-goods price dispersion figures rose in six out of eight cases in Table 3 (four columns and of capital. Maurice Obstfeld and Taylor observe that the dispersion of real interest rates for ten countries fell slightly between 1885 and 1914, jumped upward during World War I, declined somewhat during the 1920s before rising again in 1930s and reaching a peak in the mid-1940s.20 From that peak, the dispersion declined until 1960, and despite the much ballyhooed financial globalization since then, the dispersion of real rates had not changed by much up to the mid-1990s. Ultimately, by this measure, international financial markets appear to have been as well integrated in the early 1900s as they are now. In contrast, our evidence on relative capital-goods prices suggests that the dispersion of relative capital-goods prices was substantially narrower in the 1980s than at the beginning of the 1900s. Thus, compared with the 1880s, capital markets were probably far better integrated in the 1980s than the financial evidence alone suggests.
EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE PRICE OF CAPITAL GOODS
In a world of perfectly integrated commodity markets where all goods are tradable and transportation costs are zero, the relative price of capital goods should be identical across countries, and every country's time series of relative prices should follow the same trend. Tables 1 and 2 show quite clearly that this was not the case prior to 1950. Still, the patterns in Tables  1 and 2 can be understood by considering the implications of departures from perfect commodity-market integration and complete tradability. First, even though machines and consumer goods may be tradable, transport costs and tariffs will cause relative machinery prices to diverge across countries according to international differences in productivity (a Ricardian model) or skill endowments (a Heckscher-Ohlin model).21 Given that tech-nology is more advanced in high-income countries, and given that machine design and production are relatively skill-intensive activities, high-income countries should exhibit lower relative prices for machinery in the presence of imperfectly integrated global commodity markets. Figures 2A and 2B graph each country's relative price against its income per capita at the beginning of ten-to 15-year periods. Figure 2A finds no correlation between initial levels of GDP per capita and relative capital-goods prices, although if observations are excluded so that Figure 2A 'S sample is identical to that in Figure 2B , a relatively weak negative correlation emerges. Figure 2B , on the other hand, clearly shows that at times and in places where GDP per capita was higher, the relative price of machinery was substantially lower. We will discuss some potential explanations of these findings in the next section, but for now, we simply note that the negative correlation for machinery prices is in accord with findings for the postwar period.22
Second, Bela Balassa has shown that the prices of nontraded goods and services tend to be higher in countries with relatively high incomes.23 Balassa' s finding is relevant in the context of this article because the capitalgoods aggregate includes items that are traded (such as machines) as well as ones that are not (such as buildings, roads, irrigation, and other forms of construction). When traded and nontraded capital goods are combined in a single capital-goods price measure, they tend to offset one another because equipment prices are likely to be relatively low in places where nontradeable prices are likely to be relatively high. It is not too surprising, therefore, that Figure 2A finds little correlation between income and overall capital-goods prices even when Figure 2B finds a strong negative correlation between income and relative prices for machines.
Third, different rates of sectoral-productivity advance will drive changes in the relative prices of the goods those sectors produce. For example, in an economy where productivity advance is fastest in machines, slowest in building, and in-between in consumer goods, we would predict a downward trend in the price of machines relative to consumer goods, an upward trend in the price of building, and an indeterminate trend in the relative price of all capital goods. Table 1 A full explanation of international differences in relative capital-goods prices and their trends is beyond the bounds of this article. We can, however, see how the concepts in the previous paragraphs are manifested in the histories of the United States and Japan. We have chosen these case studies for two reasons. First, their economic histories include fairly well-documented narratives regarding capital-goods prices, capital accumulation, international trade, and income growth. Second, these two countries followed very different growth paths over the 80 years after 1870, and so they represent a vast range of experience. The United States started and ended the period as a world leader in income per capita and with relatively low equipment prices. Japan started the period with low income per capita and high equipment prices but experienced the biggest equipment-price decline and the fastest rate of income per capita growth. We conclude the section with an econometric investigation of the international differences in capital-goods prices. economic historians have always argued that the rate of productivity advance in the producer durables sector was relatively fast.24 For example, in studies of nineteenth-century capital accumulation, Jeffrey Williamson argued that structures and infrastructure were labor-intensive, nontradable goods undergoing slow rates of productivity growth, but that equipment was a skill-intensive, tradable capital good undergoing fast rates of productivity growth.25 These assertions appear to match up reasonably well with the U.S. evidence in Table 1 where the relative price of equipment is reported to have held steady even as the relative price of construction and all capital goods rose over the 80 years prior to 1950. Productivity advance in the machine sector might not have outpaced that in the consumption-goods sector in the United States, but it certainly did keep up, whereas productivity advance in structures and other capital goods seems to have lagged behind.
United States
Economic historians have also argued that international differences in capital-goods prices, and in machinery prices in particular, might be a reflec-tion of differences in skill endowments.26 Where labor was relatively cheap and skills relatively expensive, the relative price of machinery should have been high unless, of course, international goods markets were perfectly integrated. Conversely, where skills were cheap, the relative price of machines should have been low. Over time, this line of argument offers a reason to expect a fall in the relative price of equipment as development tends to raise skill endowments. The United States has always been relatively well endowed with skilled labor, and the comparative advantage in machines suggested by Table 2 is consistent with this perspective.
Williamson also argued that part of the decline in the U.S. relative price of capital goods between the 1840s and the 1870s was due to the Civil War tariffs, which raised the price of manufactured consumer goods relative to investment goods. The interests of southern agricultural exporters, who opposed tariffs, and northern manufacturers, who sought protection, conflicted throughout the antebellum period. Not surprisingly, with the secession and eventual defeat of the South, the balance of political power swung in favor of the northern interests which, through protection, succeeded in raising the price of manufactured consumption imports. Initially, this policy was motivated by Civil War finance, but it stuck after the war, thus making for a more permanent fall in the price of investment goods relative to manufactured consumption goods. Canada, another New World country with relatively low capital-goods prices, protected its manufacturing sector too, especially after 1878 when Conservatives came to power with an explicitly protectionist platform.27 During a period when capital goods were less tradable, this late-nineteenth-century move towards protection in North America lowered the relative price of investment goods and fostered industrial-based accumulation.
It may appear that the Argentine experience in the 1940s and 1950s is inconsistent with the American tariff experience in the 1 860s, the former contributing to higher relative capital-goods prices and the latter to lower relative prices. The key to resolving this apparent inconsistency is that U.S. capital goods in the 1860s were mainly nontradable structures and homemade machines, whereas Argentine capital goods in the 1950s were largely imported machines.28 Co-nsequently, while the U.S. Civil War tariff served to raise the relative price of manufactured consumption goods by more than that of (then mostly nontradable) investment goods, the protectionist Argentine regime-which gave lowest priority to the import of capital goods when allocating scarce foreign exchange (a populist move which secured support from urban workers)--served to raise the relative price of (then mostly tradable) investment goods. Thus, tariffs can have different effects on the relative price of capital goods in different times and places. Williamson's position on the price effect of the Civil War tariffs has been challenged recently by De Long and Douglas Irwin.29 Later, we will offer some new econometric evidence on the connection between tariffs and capital-goods prices in the pre-1950 period to assess Williamson's hypothesis.
Japan
The U.S. historiography on machine prices stresses skill endowments and productivity advance, whereas the historiography for Japan stresses international trade and wartime shortages. One of the outstanding characteristics of Table 2 is the high relative price of capital goods in Japan, especially in the 1870s and 1880s and especially for machinery. The small size of the domestic machine-tool industry at the time of the Meiji Restoration, and its evolution thereafter, is discussed at length by Toshiaki Chokki.30 Imported machines were crucial to the establishment of Japanese arsenals in the 1 870s, and, as Kozo Yamamura has pointed out, the subsequent process of military modernization appears to have provided an important impetus to the development of domestic machine production.3" During World War I domestic production of machinery expanded rapidly to fill the growing demand which could not be satisfied by imports from Britain, the United States, or Germany. Tables 1 and 2 show that the relative price of capital goods rose substantially in Japan during these years ,reflecting the increase in domestic demand coupled with an inelastic supply of machine imports during the war. Inports bounced back after the war, however, and the relative price of capital goods resumed its long-run fall. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the years of war that followed again cut off foreign supplies of machinery, and this is reflected in the rise of the relative price of machinery. These temporary shocks drove the expansion and evolution of the domestic capital-goods industry, and in doing so, may have contributed to the long-run permanent decline in Japanese capital-goods prices.
This feedback from the demand to the supply side of the capital-goods market has been most clearly articulated by Nathan Rosenberg. Although he did not discuss Japan specifically, he argued more generally that "with the growth in the demand for machinery the capital-goods industry became gradually more and more highly specialized and subdivided in order to 29 De Long, "Trade Policy"; and Irwin, "Tariffs." 30 Chokki, "History." 31 Yamamura, "Success." undertake the production of machines, the cost of producing machines was thereby sharply reduced ... 55n32 Presumably, Rosenberg's view is more likely to hold when machinery is closer to being nontradable or when there are interruptions in the flow of imports to a relatively high-price country. Of course, Rosenberg's focus was on absolute capital-goods prices, whereas this article's focus is on what we think is more relevant for investment, relative prices, and it is possible that scale and market size were even more important for consumption goods than investment goods.
In sum, the Japanese case suggests that countries will be reliant on international trade for machinery and equipment in early stages of development, although a domestic capital-goods industry may eventually emerge and grow along with the domestic economy. By implication, countries without strong domestic capital-goods industries should witness a rise in the relative price of (tradable) capital goods at times when the flow of imports is interrupted. The effect of such interruptions when nontradable capital-goods prices are taken into account is, however, less clear. This historical narrative matches the trends in Table 2 well. Japan started with a very high relative price of machinery, but it declined substantially as international transport costs fell, trade expanded, and a competitive domestic machine industry developed.
The Econometrics
We explore the capital-goods price data econometrically in Table 4 by regressing the relative capital-goods price (or equipment price) on the log of initial GDP per capita, the log of total GDP, and a measure of tariff rates (tariff revenue divided by value of imports).33 Each observation in the regression represents a particular country at the beginning of one of the followingsixperiods: 1870-1885, 1885-1900,1900-1913, 1913-1929,1929-1939, and 1939-1950 . Across columns, the sample size changes depending on the availability of tariff data.
The regressions highlight three key relationships. First, consistent with the raw data graphed in Figure 2B , GDP per capita was negatively related to the relative price of capital goods, especially equipment. This finding is consistent with our discussion of unbalanced factor productivity growth as well as with the hypothesis that countries with relatively high incomes and relatively abundant skills will be characterized by relatively cheap capital goods. The GDP per capita variable also has a big economic impact. For example, according to the coefficient on income per capita in column 2, at the turn of the century nearly 60 percent of the gap between the United States and the 32 Rosenberg, "Capital Goods," p. 223. 33 The results are similar if we use the log ofthe relative price measure as the dependent variable. We have chosen not to use the log here so that the results of this exercise dovetail with those in the next section where the connection between investment and relative prices is assessed. average relative capital-goods price for the rest of our OECD sample can be accounted for by the relatively high level of GDP per capita in the United States34 Alternatively, according to the coefficient on income per capita in column 5, about 74 percent of the tur-of-the-century gap between Japan and the average relative price of equipment for the rest of our OECD sample can be accounted for by Japan's relatively low level of GDP per capita.
Second, columns 2 and 5 show that for a given level of GDP per capita, the overall size of the domestic economy is positively correlated with relative capital-goods prices, a finding contrary to our expectations based on Rosenberg's work. Third, higher tariffs are associated with lower relative capital-goods prices, a finding which supports Williamson's interpretation of the connection between tariffs and capital-goods prices in the pre-1950 period.35 The coefficient in column 3 implies that approximately 39 percent of the turn-of-the-century gap between the average relative price of capital goods in the United States and that in the in the rest of the sample countries can be accounted for by the relatively high U. S. tariff.36 Similarly, the coefficient in column 6 implies that nearly 65 percent of the U.S. advantage in the relative price of equipment is accounted for by the relatively high tariff. Thus, to the extent that tariffs distorted prices prior to 1950 in this sample, they apparently did so in a way that favored capital goods relative to consumer goods, a finding that might help explain the positive correlation between growth and tariffs uncovered by Paul Bairoch and Kevin O'Rourke for the late nineteenth century, a correlation which is negative for the late twentieth century.37
CAPITAL-GOODS PRICES AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
As noted in the introduction, the relative price of capital goods has been featured prominently in a number of recent cross-section studies of latetwentieth-century economic growth. Jones, for example, uses data underlying the PWT to argue that "an increase in the relative price of machinery reduces capital accumulation and therefore reduces the growth rate of the economy."38 But have capital-goods prices always had this influence on investment and growth, or is it only a late-twentieth-century phenomenon? Is the influence strong enough that it belongs near center stage as we search for an explanation of the historical patterns of capital accumulation that underpin current differences in GDP per capita? Following Jones and Diego Restuccia and Carlos Urrutia, we offer an empirical assessment of the link between capital-goods prices and invest-" For the equipment price data, the coefficient on the tariffvariable remains negative and statistically significant even when the United States (a high tariff, low PKIPC country) is omitted from the regression. For the all capital goods price data, the coefficient becomes positive but statistically insignificant when the United States is omitted.
3 Note this figure is not directly comparable to the figure reported in the previous paragraph regarding the influence of GDP per capita. Both the sample and the specification change when moving from column 2 to column 3. 37Bairoch "European"; and O'Rourke, "Tariffs." 38Jones, "Economic Growth," p. 372. Table 5 . 39 We use the investment rates rather than the change in capital stock (a truer measure of capital accumulation) because capital stock estimates are not as widely available as investment estimates. For the moment, we treat the capital-goods price as an exogenous variable. Each observation in the regression represents a particular country's experience over one of the six periods defined earlier.40 The investment share in GDP is regressed on the log of GDP per capita, the relative price of capital goods (or machinery) at the beginning of each period, and the real interest rate on long-term financial assets at the beginning of each period.4" We also include time-period indicators in case period-specific circumstances affected both investment rates and capital-goods prices simultaneously, although the coefficients and statistical significance of the price variables are similar if we do not. Across columns, the sample size changes depending on the availability of price and interest-rate data. We find that the correlation between investment rates and capital-goods or equipment prices is in all cases negative and statistically significant, even after controlling for differences in levels of GDP per capita. According to Table 5 , column 1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the relative price of capital goods is associated with a decline in the investment share of about 3.6 percentage points (an elasticity of -0.68). According to column 2, a onestandard-deviation increase in the relative price of equipment is associated with a decline in the (total) investment share of 3.4 percentage points (an elasticity of -0.46). For the sake of perspective, if the United States had had a relative price of capital goods equal to the average of other countries in 1870 (not including Japan), the regression suggests that the U.S. investment share would have been about 2.4 percentage points lower than it actually was-between 1870 and 1885. Previous studies of international income convergence have found that the U.S. growth rate outpaced the predictions of long-run convergence regressions.42 In other words, the United States was a high-income country, which continued to grow quickly relative to the 39 Restuccia and Urrutia, "Public Policy." The constant price investment and GDP series from each country are used to form a series representing the constant price investment share over time, and then internationally comparable figures for investment and GDP from the PWT for 1950 are used to benchmark each country's constant price investment share in that year. On the basis of standard growth theory, Restuccia and Urrutia argue that internationally comparable prices should be used when comparing investment shares across countries. For the sake of comparison, earlier versions of this paper included estimates using current price investment rates, and qualitatively similar results emerged.
Capital-Goods Prices and Investment

ment rates in
40 Formostcountries wehaveyear-to-yearmeasures forgrowth, investment and capital goods prices, but we have chosen not to use that year-to-year variation in a time-series analysis because in many cases the national accounts (at some level) must interpolate between benchmark dates to create these series and therefore the year-to-year variation may not be informative. We believe that the historical national accounts are most useful for comparisons over longer periods of time. 41 The real interest rate figures are derived from unpublished data supplied by Michael Bordo and Alan Taylor. Of course, cross-country comparisons of such rates are necessarily inexact. 42 Wright, "Origins"; and Williamson, "Globalization." rest of the world despite the implications of neoclassical growth models. Table 5 identifies one part of the explanation: the United States was favored by low relative capital-goods prices throughout the period under consideration. Consider another case: Europe's golden era of growth over the quarter century after 1950. This was an era of spectacular catch-up on the United States, and it apparently took place in spite of relatively expensive capital goods and machinery.43 Table 2 shows that in 1950, as Europe was poised to launch its great American catch-up, the relative price of machines was substantially higher there than in the United States. These countries (and Japan) successfully converged on U.S. income levels despite their disadvantageous price structure, but they had to pay for it with higher savings rates.
Columns 3 and 4 add the real interest rate at each period's beginning to the regressions. This changes the sample composition considerably because interest-rate data are not available for every country. The real-interest-rate variable is negatively related to the investment rate, but the coefficient estimate is very imprecise. This imprecision might be due to demand-side forces that tend to raise investment and interest rates simultaneously or to problems with the international comparability ofthe interest rates, or both. Also, while using the interest rate at the period's beginning might help avoid the demand-driven bias discussed previously, the fact that real interest rates can change rather quickly might make the beginning-of-period interest rate an unreliable proxy for the full period's financial cost of capital. The specifications of columns 5 and 6 are similar to those of columns 1 and 2, but their samples are trimmed to match those of columns 3 and 4 for the sake of comparison. The coefficient estimates on the price variables are similar across the columns.
Because the relative price of capital goods is not exogenously determined and might be measured with error, this kind of estimation procedure might not offer a clean identification of the effect of capital-goods prices on investment. For example, forces which shift the demand curve for investment goods to the right will simultaneously raise the price of capital goods and quantity of investment undertaken, and this will tend to generate a (spurious) positive relationship between investment rates and relative capital-goods prices. We mitigate this bias in two ways: first, the period-specific dummies should help control for any demand-driven positive bias associated with global investment booms and busts; second, by relying on prices prevailing at the beginning of the period, rather than an average over the period, we mute demand-driven run-ups in the price within each country over any period. Furthermore, including GDP per capita in the regression should mitigate any bias associated with the relationship between level of development, capital-goods prices, and investment rates.44 Finally, including country-specific fixed effects in addition to the period effects does not eliminate the negative correlation between the price of capital goods and the investment share of GDP (results not shown). In other words, this appears to be a fairly robust empirical link. Going one step further, however, we borrow from the regressions specified in Table 4 (where relative capital-goods prices are the dependent variable) to construct two-stage least squares estimates of the connection between capital-goods prices and investment. This approach, in which the first stage is similar to that run in Table 4 and the second stage is similar to that in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , should help circumvent two potential sources of bias: the endogeneity we have already discussed, as well as measurement error in the price variables. Essentially, the total GDP and the tariff variables serve as instruments for the capital-goods price variable. The two-stage least square estimate for the effect of the relative price of capital goods on investment is -0.003317 (t-statistic equals 3.01) and for the effect of the relative price of machinery is -0.0005371 (t-statistic equals 1.87). Both estimates are at least as strong (in magnitude) as those obtained from ordinary least squares, though the standard errors are somewhat larger.45
CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
This article develops a data set that documents the relative price of capital goods in 11 countries from 1870 and 1950. Although it must be viewed as only a start on a long-term assessment, some stylized facts seem to be robust. First, different countries experienced different trends in the relative price of capital goods. Some, such as Japan, underwent a spectacular decline in the aggregate capital-goods price from 1870 to 1914, while others, such as those in Scandinavia, underwent a rise. However, and second, the relative price of equipment fell everywhere up to 1914, an event in accordance with the view that productivity growth was relatively fast in the producer-goods sector. Third, there was substantial variance in the level of the relative capital-goods prices across countries. Some, such as Japan and Italy, were disadvantaged by relatively expensive capital goods, and thus needed higher savings rates to achieve the same accumulation rates as their competitors. Others, such as Canada and the United States, were favored by relatively cheap capital goods, and thus, compared with their competitors, could achieve the same accumulation performance with lower savings rates. Fourth, the dispersion of relative prices narrowed considerably over time.
With these new data in hand, the remainder of the article pursues two questions. First, how can we explain international differences in capitalgoods price levels and trends? We argue that differences in relative prices across countries have persisted even during periods of globalization because many capital goods are nontradable, and even for the tradable goods, both 45 The tariff measure is not available for the full sample, so the ordinary least squares estimates that are relevant for the sake of comparison are not those in Table 5 . Rather, using the same sample as in the two-stage regressions, the ordinary least squares coefficients would be: -0.001869 for capital-goods prices and -0.0005195 for machinery prices. natural and political barriers to trade have always existed. Given barriers to trade and nontradable goods, international price differences arise naturally from international differences in productivity and skill endowments. These hypotheses are consistent with the strong negative correlation we find between income per capita and equipment prices. Drawing on economic historians' qualitative knowledge of U.S. sectoral productivity trends, we also argue that differential rates ofproductivity advance across sectors can generate the observed trends in relative prices of equipment, buildings, and overall capital goods.
Second, we ask whether the relative price of capital goods had a significant impact on investment. Evidently, the answer is yes: at times and in places where capital goods were relatively expensive, investmnent rates were relatively low. This finding confirms that the connection between investment rates and investment-goods prices identified by Jones and Restuccia and Urrutia for the post-1960 period existed in the pre-1950 period as well. The impact of capital-goods prices is statistically significant and economically powerful. Moreover, this negative correlation is fairly robust from an econometric standpoint.
We conclude with some speculations about the evolution of a global capital market. We have shown that capital goods markets were far better integrated in the 1980s than they were in the 1 880s, at least if one accepts price dispersion as a measure of integration. In contrast, many observers have argued thatfinancial capital markets were as well integrated a century ago as now. Thus, the time path of the capital-goods price dispersion has been quite different from that of financial variables. Presumably, we care about capital-market integration because it can have an impact on accumulation performance and the global distribution of the capital stock. The results of this article suggest that studies of international capital-market integration must take account of more than just the financial side of those markets because in both theory and history the prices of the capital goods themselves play an important role in determining investment rates and growth performance.
Appendix: Capital-Goods Price and Investment
Data, This appendix discusses the assembly of the capital-goods price indices, and it documents the sources of the price and investment series for each country in our sample. In order to move between nominal and real figures for investment, national accountants must have an investment-goods price series. However, it is rather rare for actual capital-goods prices to be used in the construction of the price indices, especially historical national accounts. It is much more common for the prices to be estimated on the basis of input prices, for example by simply combining engineering wages with steel prices for machin-ery, orby combining wages and material costs for building-construction indices, and so on for other subcomponents of investment. The "all capital goods" price index then amounts to a combination of the indices for all the underlying subcomponents.
The most glaring problem with such a method is that productivity improvements in the capital-goods sector are almost surely mnismeasured, especially in the equipment price series. Unfortunately, as Charles Feinstein notes .. . the exceptionally heterogeneous nature of most of the output-of the engineering industry makes it extremely difficult to obtain continuous price series."46
What are the implications of such issues for this study? First, regarding the trend of capital goods prices: in this article we are always looking at relative prices, and it is likely that the consumption-price indices also suffer from inadequate allowance for productivity gains. Nonetheless, ifthe omitted productivity gains bias the equipment series upward more severely than they do the consumption-price series, then the relative price of equipment would fall more in reality than inthe national accounts series. The relative price ofbuilding (where productivity advance is relatively slow), on the other hand, probably would rise more in reality than in the national-accounts series. Thus, the potential biases in the equipment and building series would tend to work against one another in the "all capital goods" series, but the degree (or direction) of bias could change over time as the relative importance of the various subcomponents of capital goods changes. These are exceptionally difficult issues facing historical national accountants, and unfortunately there is not much we can do in this article to resolve them, though the problems ought to be kept in mind when interpreting the series. Second, regarding cross-country comparisons: even if we suppose that the 1950 benchmarks are appropriate, the biases discussed in the previous paragraph will probably operate to different extents in different countries. The estimation methods differ somewhat from place to place, the nature of the underlying input-price data probably differ from place to place, and the relative importance of different kinds of investment in the overall price series must differ from place to place as well. Consequently, there is a fairly large margin of error in the cross-country comparisons, especially as we travel farther from the benchmarks. Again, short of re-creating national accounts series for each country on a consistent basis (which is impossible given the available raw data), there is not much we can do to improve the estimated series. When those price estimates are used in the investenett regressions, however, there is something we can do to attempt to circumvent the problems associated with measurement error, and this motivated our use of an instrumental variables approach to estimation.
Regarding the investment regressions: if there is measurement error in the price series, then there is measurement error in the investnent series which are based on those price estimtes. Consequently, a regression of investment rates on capital-goods prices will tend to be biased. A standard econometric method for circumventing such bias is through an instrumental variable approach to estimation. We provide such an estimate in the text, and we get results that are similar to those from an OLS regression, though with somewhat larger standard errors.
The remainder of the appendix cites the national accounts sources for the series we have used in this article. 
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